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INTRODUCTION 
Eighteenth-century Western Europe marked a turning point in warfare. The innovations in 
gunpowder technology and army organization in the seventeenth-century allowed militaries to inflict more 
damage, and employ tactics to accommodate the use of firearms. Western Europe during the eighteenth 
century is also synonymized with the Enlightenment, which cultivated an emphasis on the arts, literature, 
as well as general rationalization and secularization of the thought process. This also contributed towards 
the development in the discourse of military theory – ranging from strategy and tactics, which included 
logistics, fortification, and order of battle, to the philosophical nature of war itself. 
During the course of the eighteenth century, numerous military leaders contributed their views in 
military affairs, and published numerous works. Among them, Frederick the Great’s Principes généraux de 
la guerre were written from a noticeably pragmatic stance, and distributed among his generals as an 
instruction on conducting military campaigns.1 His Testament Politique contained chapters on military 
affairs, but was written to address the overall administration of the state, as a guideline for his heirs.2 
Though some of his battles during the Seven Years’ War, such as Kolín were disastrous, his labor in politics 
and diplomacy did ensure Prussia’s survival and ascendance into a great power from the eighteenth century 
onwards.3 Another influential military leader and thinker who wrote his works around Frederick’s time was 
Marshal Maurice de Saxe, who served the Kingdom of France as a general, and eventually maréchal. Saxe 
was a capable general, most notably during the War of the Austrian Succession, and formulated his thoughts 
on the art of war in his Rêveries, which is interpreted as an intellectual critique typical of the Enlightenment.  
Notions of the Enlightenment influenced the outlook on warfare, especially among officers. The 
gentlemanly ethos and aristocratic background most officers possessed defined the conduct of war during 
the eighteenth-century. Warfare contains general principles reproduced throughout the ages, in issues such 
as strategy and morality. Military leaders often display these values through writing or battle, yet each 
                                                             
1 Palmer, “Frederick, Guibert, Bülow”, 96. 
2 Volz, Die Politischen Testamente Friedrich's Des Grossen, IX. 
3 Scott, The Birth of a Great Power System 1740-1815, 105-107. 
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period of time or event presents distinct characteristics and trends. The Enlightenment acted as a vessel for 
military writers to interpret warfare, using newer forms of intellectual engagement. Between the years of 
1700 and 1748, there were more than 30 publications on military affairs, followed by 25 from 1748 to 
1756.4 Again, the number increased to 100 works between the years of 1756 and 1789. The surge in military 
publications characterized an increasing pattern amongst the military circle, who saw the importance of 
intellectual discussion in military matters, as a means to formalize the subject of war.  
Historian Azar Gat, in Origins of Military Thought, traces the phenomenon to the French 
Enlightenment, where there was a cohesion among the military philosophes, in what they wanted to achieve. 
The influence of the Enlightenment brought together military writers, who otherwise had different views, 
to explain war into a set of principles and theories. This notion was under the rationale that man could 
understand, and formulate all of the sciences and disciplines.5 Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, Compte de 
Guibert, another notable military philosophe, wrote  in his Essai général de tactique, “la science de la guerre 
moderne, en se perfectionnant, en se rapprochant des véritables principes, pourroit donc devenir plus simple 
et moins difficile.”6 The intellectual transformation of military thinking into what we understand today as 
military science, or military art, also saw the establishment of military academies and colleges throughout 
the European states, where the transfer of knowledge in military affairs was more institutionalized.  
Studies on eighteenth century warfare demonstrate the rigidity with regards to its conventions. The 
seasons heavily reduced an army’s ability to operate in a theater, and could lose up to one third of its original 
size during winter.7 Wherever an army went, a baggage train drawn by pack animals followed it, and was 
numerically an army in itself.8 The technological developments that began in the sixteenth and seventeenth-
century, such as firearms development and tactical organization fully matured in the eighteenth-century, 
                                                             
4 Gat, Origins of Military Thought, 25. 
5 Ibid, 27-29. 
6 Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, Compte de Guibert lived during the latter half of the eighteenth-century, and, like his 
counterparts, sought to define a clear theoretical principle on the art of war. However, his Essai also bridged the 
relationship between political and military affairs, noting their intertwined nature. The full note is in the bibliography. 
Guibert, Essai général de tactique, 85. 
7 Archer et al, World History of Warfare, 324. 
8 Ibid, 325. 
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following the decline in the use of bladed weapons, such as pikes.9 Yet the improvements did only so much 
to improve the pace of war. Linear tactics in battle spread soldiers in long, thin lines to increase the 
firepower exerted by muskets, but coordinating battalions to advance in formation was difficult, when 
mounted officers and bugle calls was one of the primary instruments of passing instructions.10 Logistics 
and poor infrastructure restrained an army’s campaign range and fighting ability. Generals and their armies 
had to navigate through a landscape dotted with fortifications, as sieges consisted an essential feature of 
warfare in the eighteenth-century.11  
Jeremy Black, a historian who has done extensive work on eighteenth-century political and military 
affairs, points out that double standards exist in the study of eighteenth-century warfare, and is often 
compared to the faster and more dynamic “Revolutionary Warfare”, which began in the late eighteenth-late 
century.12 The comparison then tends to lean toward the association that eighteenth-century warfare was 
limited in aims and objectives. An example of this examination is made by Robert Palmer. He argues the 
differences in the political systems, between the dynastic and later “revolutionary” governments defined 
the characteristics of warfare in both eras, with patriotic fervor replacing the inability of absolute monarchy 
to wage war. The disconnect between the state and its people, and the limited resources of states stemming 
from the type of government are just a few among many arguments in favor of this teleological approach.13 
Such arguments merely touch the surface on military affairs during the eighteenth-century. Geza Perjés 
provides an alternative view, concluding that the political system was less of a determining feature in the 
scope of objectives. Moreover, he argued that limitations in the military system itself were unable to fulfill 
the political objectives, which was equally ambitious in any sense.14 These included limitations in logistics 
systems, and the mobility of armies. Both views of eighteenth-century warfare represent the idea that it was 
the age of “limited warfare”, but with differing argumentation. 
                                                             
9 Van Creveld, Technology and War, 93-95. 
10 Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 200-201. 
11 Archer et al. World History of Warfare, 321-324. 
12 Black, “Eighteenth-Century Warfare Reconsidered”, 217. 
13 Palmer, “Frederick, Guibert, Bülow”, 91-93. 
14 Perjés, "Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy in the Second Half of the 17th Century", 36. 
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This thesis aims to compare and contrast the writings of Frederick and Saxe, which may further 
explain some notions of warfare in the eighteenth-century. It could show that instead of a teleological 
approach, exploring the works of Frederick and Saxe presents a different view on warfare during the 
eighteenth-century. War was perceived as an “art”, where theory and human creativity combine into the 
conduct of war. This would still resonate in the first half of the nineteenth-century, where Carl von 
Clausewitz, a Prussian military officer and writer stresses this assumption in his work Vom Kriege.15 The 
significance of military publications in the eighteenth-century is undervalued by those who argue that 
technological and socio-political change gave better means of fighting war, removing the previous 
“limitations”. Military developments during the Enlightenment is not often credited as a growth process for 
a form of war that crystallized in early decades of the nineteenth-century. Of course, technological change 
does provide improved means of fighting wars, but its role in this case is often exaggerated and misleading.  
Selecting the publications of the two military authors for comparison is justified by several reasons. 
Frederick and Saxe wrote from very different perspectives, for different intentions. Frederick’s Principes 
and Testament Politique were essentially official documents, which had a clear, practical purpose: to 
instruct his generals and successors, respectively. He specifically stated the purpose of his Principes was 
for Prussian use, to counter military threats from surrounding powers: “Je n'écris que pour mes officiers, je 
ne parle que de ce qui est applicable aux Prussiens, et je n'envisage d'ennemis que nos voisins, ce qui est 
malheureusement un synonyme.”16 For Saxe, the Rêveries’ contains much more theoretical debates. He 
stated that “War is a science so obscure and imperfect, […] no rules of conduct can be given in it.”,17 
implying that Saxe aimed to provide clarity to the nature of war, similar to his counterparts. The Rêveries 
was a critique on the practice of war, and a demonstration of Saxe’s displeasure at some practices he saw 
as outdated and lacked reasoning. Where Saxe wanted change in how wars were fought, Frederick acted 
within the limits of the system.  
                                                             
15 Gat, Origins of Military Thought, 177. 
16 Preuss, Œuvres De Frédéric Le Grand, XXVIII, 4. 
17 Saxe, Rêveries, iii.  
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Frederick and Saxe commanded their armies after the musket became a universal weapon for 
infantry, and armies discarded their pikes altogether.18 Considering how both had battlefield experience and 
wrote extensively, it is reasonable to explore their opinions on this form of warfare at its early stages. Both 
were also at different spectrums of military literature of the time. Saxe represents the intellectual scholar of 
the Enlightenment who explored the theories and what-ifs, whereas Frederick bore the responsibilities of 
maintaining not only his army, but also his state, which is shown by his practical approach. However, both 
authors’ works address several themes in warfare that represent an enlargement in military thinking the 
teleological approach does not sufficiently describe. Nonetheless, analyzing the military writings of 
Frederick and Saxe also enhances the basic understanding that warfare in the eighteenth-century was 
hindered with constraints related to the military means.  
The thesis poses the following question: in what ways can comparing the works of Frederick the 
Great and Maurice de Saxe help re-interpret the development of military affairs during the eighteenth-
century? Initially, Chapter 1 will discuss the lives Frederick and Saxe. It will be worth citing their 
biographical information, their positions on war, relevance, and other information that can put the topic of 
discussion of the thesis into context. Chapter 2 is the first area of comparison between the two authors’ 
texts. Both Frederick and Saxe’s writings contains passages and chapters that well define tactics and 
firepower. Despite the challenges Perjés outlined, with regards to the practical limitations, generals were 
nevertheless determined to decisively fight “fast” battles, and achieve superior mobility. It also 
demonstrates the technical and theoretical aspect to military thinking, increasing in sophistication. Chapter 
3 will concentrate on how both saw the issue of manpower. Recruiting enough men for an army without 
damaging a states’ economy had been a recurring problem for rulers. Both authors elaborate their preferred 
method of recruiting, and the considerations that underpin such approaches. Moral and sentimental value 
was also considered by Saxe in his opinion towards recruitment. Lastly, the concluding remarks reiterates 
the depth of military affairs during the eighteenth-century. It stiches together the discussions, demonstrating 
                                                             
18 Keegan, A History of Warfare, 344. 
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how the teleological approach lacks the considerations on the progresses within the military realm, and 
argues that exploring the military writings of the eighteenth-century contributes a larger understanding of 
eighteenth-century warfare and its developments. The conclusion puts the comparisons of the writers into 
the larger scope of eighteenth-century warfare, justifying its relevance in the study of the subject. 
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CHAPTER 1 FREDERICK AND SAXE: A COMPARISON OF TWO MEN 
Frederick the Great 
After ascending to the Prussian throne in 1740, Frederick the Great ordered his army to enter Silesia 
in the same year. Taking advantage of the well-drilled army his father had left him, as well as the shaky 
political circumstances of the newly-crowned Habsburg monarch Maria Theresa, he challenged Habsburg 
authority, and with success.19 Though the Prussians emerged victorious against the Austrians at the first 
battle in Mollwitz, Frederick had fled the battlefield, and both sides committed several tactical errors that 
resulted in a huge loss of men. Principes géneraux de la guerre was written in light of the first two of the 
three Silesian Wars, in 1746.20 The first edition, part of the thirty-volume Œuvres, was first written between 
1746 and 1747. However, the Œuvres themselves were only compiled and published between 1846 and 
1856. Frederick’s strong intellect, combined with the lessons he drew from the first Silesian campaign had 
him committed to constantly improve his army’s doctrine, by writing instructions and directives, as well as 
drilling them in maneuvers and marches.21 Most of Frederick’s substantive works were written in French, 
which he preferred over his native German. In the introduction to the Principes, Frederick expressed his 
view on the art of war strictly tailored to Prussian use, and his principles should be carried out by his 
generals at all times: “à vous enfin qui, dans mon absence, devez agir par mes principes.”22 Since the 
chapters in the Principes served a practical need to instruct his generals and successors specifically on war, 
he avoided speculative theories and abstract thoughts: his opinions were always straightforward, and 
provided concrete solutions for then-present issues. For example, when discussing the role (and placement) 
of commissaries and magazines, he wrote from his experience in Silesia and Bohemia in establishing proper 
criteria and instructions.23 He elaborated: 
La première règle est de faire vos amas principaux sur vos derrières, et toujours dans une 
ville fortifiée […] Quand on fait son principal magasin devant l’armée, on court risque de 
                                                             
19 Clark, Iron Kingdom, 191-196. 
20 Palmer, “Frederick, Guibert, Bülow”, 96. 
21 Citino, The German Way of War, 48-49. 
22 Preuss, Œuvres, XXVIII, 3-4.   
23 Ibid, 18-22. 
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le perdre au premier échec,  et l’on est sans ressource; au lieu que, les mettant par échelons, 
on ne fait pas la guerre en désespéré, et une petite disgrâce n’entrainera pas votre perte 
totale.24 
In addition to the Principes, Frederick’s Testament Politique was first finished in 1752, and the 
second version written in 1768. The Testament was further compiled and published under the title Die 
Politischen Testamenten Frederich’s Des Grossen, edited by the German historian Gustav Berthold Volz 
in 1920. The Testament served to address his heir on the issues of ruling over a state, as it was common 
practice for the Hohenzollern monarchs to leave instructive texts to their heirs. The Testament and Principes 
differed in perspective and subject matter. The Testament addressed the issue of economics, politics, and 
military affairs from a ruler’s point of view, and concerned the proper governance of the three spheres from 
a larger scope. His sense of duty that a monarch should fulfill is reflected in his Testament, as he wrote: 
“Le souverain est le premier serviteur de l’État. Il est bien payé, pour qu’il soutienne la dignité de son 
caractère; mais on demande de lui qu’il travaille efficacement pour le bien de l’État, et qu’il gouverne au 
moins avec attention les principales affaires.”25 The Testament does contain a section on military affairs, 
yet it concerns the larger aspect of organization and administration, with much less emphasis on strategy 
and tactics. On the other hand, the Principes displays a different attitude, as he pragmatically sought to 
better the army’s ability to fight, and address the technical aspect of warfighting from the lens of a general, 
with a practical aim.26 Frederick did not trust the individual soldier; moreover, he relied on harsh discipline 
to control what he believed a group of rowdy and indolent people into one, mechanical fighting force. 
Frederick emphasized the role of discipline in his army:  
La plus grande partie d'une armée est composée de gens indolents; si le général n'est sans 
cesse à leurs trousses, toute cette machine si ingénieuse et si parfaite se détraquera bien 
vite, et le général n'aura plus qu'en idée une armée bien disciplinée.27  
This variance in outlook shows the various layers of Frederick’s character, as he presented himself as an 
“Enlightened monarch”, putting himself in the forefront of duty and service towards his subjects. On the 
                                                             
24 Preuss, Œuvres, XXVIII, 19. 
25 Volz, Die Politischen Testamente Friedrich's Des Grossen, 38. 
26 Gat, Origins of Military Thought, 57. 
27 Preuss, Œuvres, XXVIII, 6. 
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other hand, the ideas of the Enlightenment also reflected in his military works, as he sought to address war 
with theories and principles based on rational thinking and experience. The military writings of Frederick 
characterize him as a military leader, who was demanding and had high expectations for his officers. 
Frederick’s campaign in Bohemia during the Seven Years’ War (1754-1763) came at a great cost. 
Surrounded by adversaries, war seemed inevitable if Prussia was to put effort in keeping herself intact. 
Though he managed to compel the Austrian forces to retreat inside Prague in 1757, an Austrian relief force 
under Marshall Daun arrived, forcing Frederick to lift the siege on Prague and fight Daun, resulting in his 
first defeat at the Battle of Kolín.28 In Saxony, Frederick faced better odds. At Rossbach, he managed to 
outmaneuver the opposing force under the concealment of Janus Hill, and completely surprise the French-
led allied forces who were in marching column, with little time to deploy.29 The 20,000 strong Prussian 
army only lost 169 men, whereas the allied forces lost 5,000 men, and another 5,000 captured. 30 For 
Frederick, the Seven Year’s War gave him the experience of the extremities in both victory and defeat at 
nearly equal intensities. Frederick died in 1786, and his nephew Frederick-William II succeeded the throne. 
Maurice de Saxe 
Maurice de Saxe (1696-1750) was one of the illegitimate sons of Augustus II of Poland and elector 
of Saxony (1670-1733). From the age of 12 he began his military service, serving under Eugene of Savoy, 
though kept out of direct action for a while, to focus on his studies.31 Eugene served under the Habsburg 
crown, and among the wars he fought, he was instrumental in the Austro-Turkish War (1716-1718). Saxe 
also fought in the war, and participated in the Siege of Belgrade.32 In comparison with Frederick, Saxe had 
firsthand experience of facing the Ottomans at war, which gave him the opportunity of fighting an enemy 
who fielded different tactics and equipment. Saxe’s experience in the Austro-Turkish war materialized later 
on, as he recalled how a battalion that fired the first volley was ultimately defeated by a charging Turkish 
                                                             
28 Citino, The German Way of War, 69-71. 
29 Holmes, Oxford Companion to Military History. 
30 Citino, The German Way of War, 81. 
31 D’Auvergne, The Prodigious Marshal, 24. 
32 White, Marshal of France: The Life and Times of Maurice, Comte de Saxe, 38-39. 
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unit: “instantaneously after which, the Turks rushed towards through the smoke, without allowing them a 
moment’s time to fly, and with their sabres cut the whole to pieces upon the spot”.33 His particular opinion 
on firepower and tactics is partly shaped by this observation, and is expressed in the Rêveries. Similarly, 
Saxe observed the lack of discipline in the Turkish soldiers, comparing to how the Gauls were constantly 
inferior to the Roman legions: “The Turks are now an instance of the same; for it is neither in courage, 
numbers, nor riches, but in discipline and order, that they are defective.”34 
 During the early stages of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), he was given a division 
of troops. Upon command of the division, he managed to rout an enemy force, and stopped a convoy of 
barges, presumably containing supplies. Afterwards, the Elector of Bavaria, one of his superiors, 
complimented him, and said, “It should suffice that you have merited sovereignty; the rank you hold in the 
French army is superior to the dukedom of Kurland.”, referring to the fact that Saxe sought for the Duchy 
of Courland, 35 but eventually failed to obtain it, after having forced to surrender the duchy to a Russian 
replacement.36 In 1744 he was given the title Marshal of France, a military distinction that was given to 
generals for their achievements in battle. Additionally, the title given to Saxe most likely caused controversy 
within the French elite, as he was German, an illegitimate child of a monarch, and a Protestant – conditions’ 
that would have traditionally denied him the title.37 
Saxe wrote his Rêveries in 1732, under a fever. Written in French, one of the earliest editions was 
posthumously published in 1757, seven years after his death, along with an English translation. Subsequent 
editions have been published in the mid to late eighteenth-century. Saxe wrote his Rêveries in thirteen 
nights, and dismissed the seriousness of his work: “I composed this work in thirteen nights. Being sick to 
the point of fever, I must be forgiven the want of regularity and arrangement and faults of style. I write in 
military fashion and to dissipate my ennui.”38 However, it was common for authors at his time to dismiss 
                                                             
33 Saxe, Rêveries¸21.  
34 Ibid, 47. 
35 White, Marshal of France: The Life and Times of Maurice, Comte de Saxe, 200. 
36 Ibid, 69 
37 Ibid, 134. 
38 D’Auvergne, The Prodigious Marshal, 169. 
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their writings as casual scribbles.39 But why did he really write it? Was it really just for entertainment 
purposes? The extent of the seriousness and intentions the Rêveries is unclear, in comparison to Frederick’s 
works. Despite containing in-depth critiques and analyses, the intended audience of Saxe’s work is open to 
debate, as he died before ever given the opportunity to implement his ideas in real life. Saxe wrote from a 
position that allowed him to explore his creative boundaries, and at the same time entertain himself and the 
potential audiences of his Rêveries. There is also the possibility that even if he was unable to fulfill the 
contents of his work, he could have wished that the ideas in the Rêveries are recognized in the future. The 
amount of detail Saxe addressed in the Rêveries goes beyond the discussion of strategy, tactics, and other 
sublime concepts of war. The first section demonstrates Saxe’s ideal army, and precisely dictates how the 
uniform should be designed. Saxe’s reasoning was that, “Our dress is not only expensive, but 
inconvenient…the love of appearance prevails over the regards due to health, which is one of the grand 
points demanding our attention.”40 Even with his modest and trivial attitude towards his “casual scribbles”, 
the ideas he presented were well-grounded with reasoned thought, displaying a vast wealth of knowledge, 
based on experience and intellectual capacity.  
Essentially, the Rêveries is a military treatise that aims to address the nature of war, intellectually 
challenge some of the practices of war, as well as incorporate ideals from the past. For example, he was 
displeased at the order of placing infantry and cavalry at the center and wings, respectively. Saxe supported 
the idea of infantry and cavalry working closely as a unit, citing the organization of Roman legions as an 
example.41 He proposed the army to be organized into “legions”, in a combination of infantry, cavalry, and 
artillery, arranging them in as a cohesive unit in battle, in contrast with the separate organization of infantry 
and cavalry a typical army would have.42 Along with other military thinkers such as Marquis de Puységur, 
                                                             
39 Gat, Origins of Military Thought, 31. 
40 Saxe, Reveries, 4 
41 Ibid, 64. 
42 Ibid, 24-32.  
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Saxe himself was supportive of the notion that “the art of war was also susceptible to systematic 
formulation, based on rules and principles…”43 In the introduction, Saxe stated: 
There has been a gradual decline amongst us; which must be imputed to out having blindly 
adopted maxims, without any examination of the principles on which they were founded; 
from whence proceeds that confusion of customs, where everyone has assumed the 
privilege of adding, or diminishing at pleasure.44 
Saxe contended that the military maxims at the time were practiced without any substantial insight, 
rendering such doctrines into rigid customs. The equilibrium in military technology, strategy, and tactics 
between armies had generals more inclined to follow established and proven maxims. Saxe’s stance in the 
discourse was typical of the “salon” philosophe of the Enlightenment. He believed that warfare could be 
quantified and rationalized into definitive principles and theories. 45  He presents an analogy of the 
importance in grasping a discipline’s theories and reasoning: 
A person who has a taste for architecture, and can design, will draw the plan of a palace 
with great correctness; but if he is obliged to execute it, and is, at the same time, ignorant 
of the method of shaping his materials, and laying his foundation, the whole fabric must 
presently fall to ruin.46 
The introduction to the Rêveries already demonstrates the differences between Saxe and Frederick’s 
approach. In comparison to Frederick, Saxe was much stronger in expressing discontent towards aspects of 
warfare in the eighteenth-century, as he theoretically dissected the principles and norms of conducting 
warfare in the eighteenth-century. Though the Rêveries was an intellectual criticism on warfare, Saxe also 
addressed practical issues and solutions in the first section. He proposed that each soldier should be 
equipped with his own personal sack to store all the forage and other personal effects as a means to ease 
the army’s reliance on long baggage trains.47  
 Frederick the Great and Maurice de Saxe took different approaches in perceiving warfare. 
Frederick, given the well-drilled Prussian army, focused on stretching the limits of what his army could 
achieve using discipline and training. The speed at which the Prussian army could march, advance, and fire 
                                                             
43 Gat, Origins of Military Thought, 29.  
44 Saxe, Rêveries, iv. 
45 Gat, Origins of Military Thought, 27.  
46 Saxe, Rêveries, vii. 
47 Ibid, 51-52. 
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allowed him to achieve the upper hand during campaigns. His instructions and directives such as the 
Principes outlined the procedures of executing actions, such as the type of maneuvers to employ in certain 
situations. Frederick also chose not to commit much in attempting to philosophically define the art of war; 
he presented practical ideas. Moreover, his military writings consisted more on military principles and 
maxims instead of intellectual debate. In addition, his Testament display the images of a benevolent 
monarch, whose duty was to serve the state and its subjects. On the other hand, the Rêveries of Saxe reflects 
the speculation and deliberation of a philosophe in the Enlightenment. Saxe searched for the weaknesses in 
the state of warfare during the eighteenth-century, and applied reasoned criticism and methods in discussing 
his findings. He took into account the slow-paced nature of sieges and battles from his own experience, and 
proposed changes to some aspects of the military system at a larger scale, such as his legions, and the role 
of fortifications. Nevertheless, Frederick and Saxe contribute, from their purposes and intentions of writing, 
as well as their approaches, the differing angles on military thought during the eighteenth-century. 
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CHAPTER 2 PRACTICAL CHALLENGES, TACTICS AND FIREPOWER 
The texts written by Frederick and Saxe allow for contrasts to be drawn in varying degrees. Among 
them, tactics and firepower are discussed by both authors. Moreover, marching and advancing in battle are 
presented at length by both men, which provide a unique view in the order of battle during the eighteenth-
century. It is beneficial to outline some of the practical challenges that generals in the eighteenth-century 
would have faced, as the tactics employed during the eighteenth-century were also used to address the 
challenges, with regards to movement in particular. 
Challenges of Eighteenth-century Warfare 
Historian Géza Perjés describes the crisis of strategy that seventeenth and eighteenth-century 
armies faced. For armies to move from marching formation to battle formation required considerable time 
and effort, a fact Frederick and Saxe discussed by length in their texts.48 The number of armies in a theater 
increased this difficulty. The army marched in columns, and changed into line formation before battle, in 
order to disperse larger volleys of musket fire. 49  This caused delay in an army’s transition to battle 
formation, and made it easier for an enemy force to notice the movement. Thus, more leeway was granted 
in either choosing to face battle, or simply to keep marching until suitable ground or time was found to be 
more advantageous for the enemy force.50 Jamel Ostwald used the Duke of Marlborough’s campaign in the 
Low Countries during the War of the Spanish Succession as a case study. It was difficult for opposing 
armies to commit into pitched battle, since armies constantly marched to find tactically favorable positions, 
and the time it took for armies to change into battle formation decreased the chances of pitched battle even 
more. Ostwald describes that despite the Duke’s determination to confront the French in an open battle, 
Villeroi, the French general, kept maneuvering into easily-defendable positions, and denied the chance of 
facing the Duke of Marlborough in battle for some time.51  
                                                             
48 Perjés, "Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy in the Second Half of the 17th Century", 35-36. 
49 Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 201-202. 
50 Ostwald, "The "Decisive" Battles of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare", 
657-663. 
51 Ibid, 661-662. 
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Logistics too, presented its obstacles. When intending to launch a campaign, armies had to take 
into consideration the time of year, since man and beast required food for sustenance, including barley, 
wheat, fodder for horses etc., which needed careful planning in advance, so as to not commit too much 
troops when marching across the countryside and run the risk of shortage in supplies. Armies also relied on 
supply magazines for their logistical requirements, and it was ill-advised to conduct marches far from these 
magazines.52 Saxe calculated that a single campaign may reduce the strength of an army to one third and 
one half of its original strength. Winter months were spent to harass the enemy using smaller forces, and 
the full force was fully committed during spring and summer.53 The relationship between the population 
density of a theatre of war and its ability to provide bread for the soldiers in the given area, should an army 
solely rely on grain supplies found in the immediate surroundings in its theatre of war. If the daily 
requirements of an army 60,000 strong was 675 q of grain, and a population density as low as 10 per sq. 
km may theoretically provide 18,000 q of grain six months after harvest, for an army to bake its bread and 
feed all the men, almost a month’s supply.54 Technical problems related to the procurement and processing 
of grain supplies into edible bread. If the said army was to bake bread on the spot for its daily rations alone, 
the process of milling required 135 mills to process the 675 q of grain, and the baking process required 
sufficient amount of bricks, firewood, and ovens to be able to bake the daily amounts, in addition to the 
transportation of these items, as well as the time needed to complete the cycle.55 
Tactics and Firepower 
For tactical advantage, Frederick relied on practicing drill and maneuver exercises in order for his 
infantry and cavalry to be more efficient in advancing and listening to commands.56 Frederick also expected 
his infantry to be proactive in advancing, hoping to intimidate and yield the enemy of his ground. He wrote 
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in his instructions that “The most certain way to insure victory is to march boldly and in order against the 
enemy, always endeavoring to win ground.”57 With regards to marching order, Frederick dedicated one 
section for types of marches that should be employed in every scenario conceivable. This ranges from 
marching parallel close to the enemy, and enable the army to deploy easily, to an “ordinary” march far from 
the enemy, which aims to secure the roads leading to the next campsite.58 The emphasis of moving quickly, 
and arranging the army into battle formation is highlighted. For example, when marching into a potential 
battle, Frederick insisted that all baggage should be offloaded, and brought to the nearest settlement or 
encampment: “Quand on marche à l'ennemi à l'intention d'engager une affaire, on se débarrasse de tout son 
bagage, qu'on envoie sous une escorte à la ville la plus voisine”.59 On a larger, strategic scale, it was also 
made clear that long wars for Prussia would deteriorate both his army and his state, considering the smaller 
population and resources available to Prussia compared with the major European powers. He wrote: 
J'ajoute à ces maximes que nos guerres doivent être courtes et vives. Il ne nous convient 
pas du tout de traîner les choses en longueur. Une guerre de durée détruirait insensiblement 
notre admirable discipline; elle dépeuplerait le pays, et épuiserait nos ressources.60  
Frederick emphasized the need to maximize firepower – that is the ability to fire and load muskets 
at a faster rate than other armies, at a rate of five to six rounds per minute.61 Initially, the Principes dictated 
that firepower was for the defense, and that bayonets should be used in offensives: “notre infanterie est 
également bien partout; elle a le feu pour défensive, et la baïonnette pour offensive.”62 However, in the 
Testaments of 1768, Frederick was more supportive on using firepower, and the ability load faster in order 
to overwhelm the enemy, as he stated, “Les batailles se gagnent par la supériorité du feu… l’infanterie qui 
charge le plus vite, l’emportera sans contredit sur celle qui charge plus lentement.”63 Frederick justified this 
through his experience in the battles of Rossbach and Torgau, though both battles, especially Rossbach 
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were won through the Prussian army’s maneuver into catching the allied forces by surprise.64 However, 
what Frederick most likely highlighted was the firing speed of his infantry battalions at the pinned allied 
columns, at which seven battalions did most of the firing, and some units did not receive the chance to fire 
at all.65 
For Saxe, speed and mobility were equally important as they were to Frederick, and his Rêveries 
addressed such issues with the proposed legions he asserted, or with any other order of battle. The legion 
itself consisted of four regiments, with each regiment containing four centuries of infantry, and each century 
possessing half centuries of light footmen and cavalry in addition to infantry.66 At the lowest level, a century 
consisted of 10 companies with approximately 15 men each. Furthermore, artillery was also included in the 
legions. The infantry in Saxe’s legions were arranged in a depth of four men. They were to be armed with 
a musket and a pike in the two rear lines, and the two front ranks armed with a musket. The composition of 
the legions allowed an army to obtain more flexibility on the battlefield. Saxe made clear that the legions 
could be detached in order to fulfill a specific set of objectives:  
…if the commander in chief of an army wants to take possession of some post; to obstruct 
the enemy in their projects; or, in short, to execute any of those various enterprises… he 
has nothing more to do, than to detach some particular legion upon it; which, as it is 
furnished with every material…67 
Since the legion consisted of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, the subordinate units can be detached and 
perform specific tasks that might require all three arms, allowing more independence and in achieving 
tactical objectives.  
 Saxe’s disposition on tactics and firepower is also expressed in general, regardless of his legions. 
In relation to movement, Saxe noted the lack of discipline in marching, and assumes that not many knew 
the purpose of marching into battle, regarding it simply as ritual: “without knowing the purpose or true use 
of it, and as universally believed, that the sound (of the marching beat) is intended for nothing more than a 
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warlike ornament.”68 Additionally, Saxe observed the lack of unison and organization in marching during 
his time, in that individual soldiers’ pace were not synchronized when marching in formation. This caused 
significant congestion when a change of pace or direction occurred. Thus, Saxe opted for soldiers to march 
in cadence, in which not only the formation was observed, but also the harmonization of the pace in each 
soldier’s march: “The way to obviate these inconveniences (of the congestion in marches)…is nothing more 
than to march in cadence”.69  
 In firepower, Saxe expressed a specific focus in the use of muskets in an army. If Frederick assumed 
that the army who loads and fire the most rounds prevails, Saxe took a different approach. Instead, he 
compared two supposed battalions facing each other: “the one that gives its fire in advancing; or the other, 
that reserves it; men of any experience will, with great reason, give it in favour of the latter”.70 By conceding 
the first volley to the enemy, a line of infantry can advance forward without worrying of another volley 
while the opposing force reloads, and in closer range, can engage the enemy using the bayonet. This is 
otherwise known as shock tactics, as it aims to cause psychological unease with an offensive charge. In this 
case, the battalion which fired the first volley would be preoccupied with reloading their muskets and a 
charging enemy, increasing the chances of disintegrating the formation. Saxe also expressed a distrust of 
firearms’ reliability: “I have seen whole vollies fired, without even killing 4 men”.71 As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Saxe saw action against the Ottoman forces, which naturally fought with different tactics 
and organizations in comparison to the European armies. However, the charge of the Ottomans at Belgrade 
convinced him that shock tactics were superior vis-à-vis the muskets at the time. 
Despite his proposals for reintroducing the old-fashioned pike as a weapon in the battlefield, Saxe 
displayed the need for flexibility, in having a wider range of equipment and formations to respond to 
different types of situations in battle. In comparison to Frederick, his Principes and Testaments, the ideas 
presented in the Rêveries, such as the legion were more original, as Saxe attempted to address the practice 
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of warfare of his age, using his models and approach that are accompanied with intellectual reasoning.72 
Apart from theoretical discussion, the Rêveries also includes analysis on practical issues, such the use of 
shock tactics. Yet again, these considerations were backed by in-depth reasoning that Saxe provides 
throughout his work. On the contrary, Frederick’s aim in his military writings was to effectively provide 
military solutions for his army, under conventional means.73 In other words, he aimed to perfect the methods 
the Prussian army followed, in order to conduct military operations with much more efficacy and precision.  
What the comparisons between the thoughts of Frederick and Saxe have shown were the differences 
in how they saw tactics and firepower. Moreover, the crisis of strategy Géza Perjés’ elaborated constrained 
the time and space of campaign theatres. The difficulty of moving into battle formation for armies, 
combined with other challenges such as supply management and the abundance of fortresses in the 
countryside created tactical and strategic obstacles for generals and their armies.74 A key comparison would 
on the author’s opinion of firepower. Saxe was less supportive in using musket skills, and preferred the 
reliability of shock tactics to break enemy lines. On the contrary, Frederick was comfortable in keeping the 
musket as an offensive tool, relying on the superior loading skill of his army. Such observations provide 
relevance as to rigidity of linear tactics, and how both attempted to overcome the limitations of the 
convention. By looking at what Frederick and Saxe’ positions on tactics and firepower, it seems clear that 
both addressed these practical challenges. Though Frederick and Saxe might have not labeled the above 
mentioned as “limitations”, both would have been certainly influenced by either the factors. 
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CHAPTER 3 CHANGES IN THE SOURCES OF MANPOWER 
Beginning in the late seventeenth-century, the process of recruiting an army underwent a shift. 
Before, military entrepreneurs and other businessmen with vested interests played an important role in 
covering the costs of raising, training, and maintaining a regiment.75 However, armies in the eighteenth-
century, while still relied on entrepreneurs for a portion of their supplies during campaign. The English 
merchant Sir Solomon Medina supplied the Duke of Marlborough’s provisions during the War of the 
Spanish Succession. 76  Nonetheless, at the turn of the century, western European states became more 
inclined to bypass these entrepreneurs and intermediaries, preferring to raise armies with their own 
resources and administration, with most of the officers involved in the recruitment process.77 In the case of 
Prussia, Frederick the Great’s father, Frederick-William I influenced the landowning class of Prussia, or 
Junkers, demanding the men from these families to serve in the Prussian army as officers, and prohibit them 
from serving or even travelling abroad.78 In other words, the eighteenth-century saw a shift in how states 
recruited their soldiers.  
Voluntary recruiting was also present during this time, as some officers and their NCO’s, or Non-
Commissioned Officers would form recruiting parties, and travel to convince the common folk to join. 
Essentially, NCO’s enforced the orders and commands of the officers in a unit, for the soldiers to follow 
them. Deceptive means were employed to coerce men into service, as cases in the German states show, 
wedding parties and church services were held hostage, with recruiters finding able-bodied men in these 
settings.79 On the other hand, armies also consisted professional soldiers under contract, as well as others 
who were motivated by economic or sentimental reasons. Frederick stated that “Nos régiments sont 
composés la moitié de citoyens, et l'autre moitié de mercenaires…”80, underlining the diverse composition 
                                                             
75 Parrot, "From military enterprise to standing armies: war, state, and society in Western Europe, 1600-1700.", 74-
80. 
76 Van Creveld, Supplying War, 30. 
77 Anderson, War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 111-113. 
78 Ibid, 115-116. 
79 Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 90. 
80 Preuss, Œuvres De Frédéric Le Grand, XXVIII, 5. 
22 
 
of an army, with regards to their origins and motivations. Nonetheless, the soldiers developed a sense of 
pride and belonging to the armies they served. An example being the resentment between Prussian and 
Saxon forces, after the Prussian cavalry decimated the Saxon infantry at the battle of Hohenfriedberg 
(1745).81  
Frederick and Saxe display their views on the sources of military manpower. This discussion also 
entails the nature of recruitment, including conscription, and some of the issues that come with it. The 
compromise between the use of Prussian males for economic productivity and as a source of manpower for 
his army forms a predicament that Frederick expressed in his writings, whereas Saxe was mainly concerned 
with the moral reasoning behind the nature of recruiting during the eighteenth-century. Furthermore, Saxe 
proposed his own ideas in finding a sustainable mode of manpower for an army.  
Among the European states, Prussia implemented a system of conscription. The whole state was 
divided into districts called cantons, each consisting of 5,000 men available for duty. Initially introduced 
by Frederick-William I in 1732, the canton system allowed many exemptions for a number of people, and 
service usually lasted only two months a year.82 The 1768 version of the Testaments distinguished the role 
of cantons during war and peace. With Prussia having a smaller population base compared to the other 
European powers, balancing the sources of manpower for army recruitment was important, in order to avoid 
draining the local economies of the cantons. During peacetime, Frederick minimized the number of men 
that would perform the two-month rotations. Citing the number of men at productive age at approximately 
one million, he wrote:  
Si nous ne voulions composer l’armée que de nationaux, il faudrait défalquer 160,000 
hommes de ce million, ce qui serait hors de toute proportion. De la manière que les choses 
sont arrangées, le pays ne fournit qu’en tout à l’armée 70,000 hommes. Cette proportion 
est forte, mais elle est tolerable.83 
As a result, at almost any given time during Frederick’s role, half of the army consisted of foreigners 
recruited through various means, either voluntarily or through impressment. Desertion was a key concern 
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for Frederick, as the lack of attachment to the state amongst the foreigners increased the chances of 
desertion, at a risk of punishment if caught. 84  Compared to the cantonal recruits, the foreigners had 
significantly longer contracts. The role of the cantons during wartime was to replenish any regiments that 
were understrength, as this was outlined in the Testament of 1768: “Les cantons rendent les régiments 
immortels, parcequ'ils réparent leurs pertes sans cesse.”85 However, Frederick was reluctant on using the 
cantons to fully replenish his army, and reserved it for the last resort: “Il faut ménager ces hommes utiles 
et laborieux comme la prunelle de l’œil et, en temps de guerre, ne tirer des recrues du pays que lorsque la 
dernière nécessité y contraint.”86 In comparison to the Testament of 1752, the 1768 Testament was written 
after the Seven Years War, which cost greatly to the Prussian economy. During this point, Frederick was 
preoccupied with the recovery of the Prussian economy, and concentrated on building more infrastructure 
and revitalize the industrial base.87  
 For Saxe, the sources of manpower are described in the first article of the Rêveries. Like Frederick, 
Saxe was also concerned with desertion, and forms an important point in his approach to recruitment. Saxe 
morally objected the recruitment of soldiers through deceptive means, and also saw it as ineffective because 
of the increased possibility of desertion: “neither is the service benefited by those unlawful proceedings, 
for sensible of the hardship imposed upon them, they seize the first opportunity to leave it…”88 Rather, to 
secure a steady stream of recruits for the army, the Rêveries proposed that military service be enforced by 
law. Saxe’s rationale was that “In course of time, every one would regard it as an honor rather than a duty, 
to perform his task;”89 As such, Saxe’s proposal was to implement conscription for a period of five years, 
for males between the ages of twenty and thirty. Though polities have long since practiced some form of 
mandatory military service, Saxe’s reasoning for encouraging conscription also lies within the role of 
society of a state and its obligation to defend its interests: “it is both natural and just for people to be engaged 
                                                             
84 Preuss, Œuvres De Frédéric Le Grand, XXVIII, 5. 
85 Volz, Die Politischen Testamente Friedrich's Des Grossen, 140. 
86 Ibid.  
87 Kyte, "Frederick the Great and the Development of the Prussian Army", 30-31. 
88 Saxe, Rêveries, 1.  
89 Ibid, 2. 
24 
 
in the defence of that state of which they constitute a part”.90 Saxe has an ideal perspective in the egalitarian 
sense, and proposed that within the conscription any degree of class and hierarchy in the treatment of the 
recruits removed. He predicts that if the abolishment of elitism would have:  
Every man at length esteem it an honor to serve his term: the poor would be comforted by 
the example of the rich (who oblige to conscription); and the rich could not with decency 
complain, seeing themselves on a footing with the nobles.91 
Saxe observed the practical issue and conscription and how it would alleviate the constraints of recruiting 
men through coercion, and also ensure a reliable flow of recruits. However, he accentuates the relationship 
between society and war, to which the latter he considers an “honorable profession”. Saxe implied an army 
that consisted of a state’s citizens performed better than an army with foreigners, comparing them to the 
Roman Legions, as it consisted of Roman citizens. He criticized the fact that soldiers at the time mostly 
consisted of the lowest levels of productive society, “which is collected, to compose the soldiery: but such 
measures, and such men, are different from those, by means of which the Romans conquered the 
universe.”92  
 The comparison on the ideal sources manpower between Frederick and Saxe reveals interesting 
contrasts in their perspectives. Frederick, in the Testament, considered the economic repercussions of 
having an army that solely consisted of Prussia citizens, and maintained the equal ratio of foreigners and 
Prussians. Frederick also believed that the cantons should be used as a last measure when replenishing men 
during wars, as he risked losing a portion of the Prussian workforce. It was a common belief until the latter 
half of the eighteenth-century that armies should consist of the least productive individuals, which included 
criminals, vagabonds, and other unemployed persons.93 In Frederick’s perspective, the cantons were purely 
practical purposes, and he did not attempt to instill any sense of patriotism and duty to it. On the contrary, 
Saxe’s rationale of state-enforced conscription allowed practical means of retaining a standing army, but 
also touched upon the philosophical values of having such a system. The notion of equal treatment was 
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propelled by Saxe in his idea for conscription. Saxe also believed in society’s proactive role in promoting 
the states interests through armed means, at least for those who are obliged. This would fully materialize 
later on during the Napoleonic wars.  
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CONCLUSION 
The thesis has explored the writings of Frederick the Great and Maurice de Saxe, and in turn provide 
interesting perspectives on the development of military affairs during the eighteenth-century. These 
progressions in military affairs range from the opinions of both authors in tactics, firepower, and the sources 
of manpower. It shows the limitations of eighteenth-century warfare in terms of its practicality and rigid 
conventions, particularly in an army’s campaign. Additionally, what the comparisons of the two author-
generals also produce, is the growth of military thinking through the writings that put the eighteenth-century 
in a focal point that influenced military affairs in the subsequent centuries. The teleological approach to 
warfare during the eighteenth-century, and its comparison to nineteenth-century warfare does provide a 
valid point in attributing the role of the political system in determining warfare. However, it lacks the depth 
that the military writings signify. The works of Frederick and Saxe demonstrate the cultivation of war into 
a formalized study and subject that subsequent military leaders up until the present day perceive.  
The comparison of Frederick and Saxe on tactics and firepower exhibit the limitations of warfare 
in the eighteenth-century. It also shows how both addressed these issues from different positions, in 
attempting to use practical and theoretical solutions to overcome these constraints. Differences in the 
preference of firepower are clearly seen, and is one of the examples of overcoming the limits of linear 
warfare. The limitations of war are clearly defined, and show that it stemmed from a military system that 
was unable to deliver conclusive results. Nonetheless, it also meant that military leaders were determined 
to wage decisive wars, as the Principes and Rêveries outline. The question of decisiveness and 
determination is asked of warfare in the eighteenth-century. However, the determination of military leaders 
such as Frederick has proven that eighteenth-century battles can be decisive, despite the challenges they 
faced. 
The third chapter looked at the two authors perspectives on the sources of manpower and recruiting. 
Comparing and contrasting the opinions between Frederick and Saxe show the developments of military 
thinking that enlarged, with regards to the addition of recruitment as an institutionalized process that 
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demanded more attention. However, it also demonstrates the change in the composition of armies. Who 
should serve in the army? Is it better to fully compose the army of a state’s own citizens, or foreigners? 
These questions are partly answered by Frederick and Saxe, and during their active period European 
militaries were gradually transforming their methods of recruitment, until the nineteenth-century. These 
trends of finding a source of manpower well describes the eighteenth-century as a period where the 
institutionalization of the armed forces within state control was maturing, and dispels the argument that the 
dynastic system of government hindered the state’s ability to use its resources. 
In answering the research question, the development of military affairs during eighteenth-century 
was greatly propelled by military publications and their authors. With evidence from secondary sources on 
the conduct of war, analyzing the military works of the eighteenth-century can help re-interpret our 
understanding in the development of military affairs. Under the Enlightenment, military authors collectively 
possessed a rationale to define warfare, and publish their works in such as a short timespan among each 
other. Moreover, not only did the amount of published works pose a significance, but the varying 
perspectives of these authors reveal the degree of activity in this field. Frederick and Saxe represent a 
fraction of this diversity; in what they wrote, why they wrote, and how they wrote. These two authors, along 
with many others such as Guibert clearly defined their interpretations of war, with principles and other 
assessments that carried with it logic and rationality.  
The depth of scope in eighteenth-century warfare, along with the military thinking demonstrates 
that arguing how eighteenth-century warfare was constrained by the dynastic system of politics is 
insufficient. The sense that eighteenth-century was a time of “limited warfare” produces several 
explanations. That eighteenth-century warfare was limited in aims and objectives, influenced by the forces 
of dynastic political systems is faulty. Additionally, comparing the warfare of eighteenth-century to the 
newer forms of warfare found during the revolutionary and Napoleonic era naturally brings the perception 
that eighteenth-century warfare is primitive and “limited”. If it is so, then what is to be concluded of the 
military writings? Are the developments in military thinking limited by the socio-political structures as 
well? This research explored the features of eighteenth-century warfare, and finds that there is a wealth of 
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issues and themes that can be further discussed. What is certain was that the means to carry out military 
operations were constrained by limitations in the military system of the time, such as the organization of 
armies, their logistical systems, and the reliance on supply magazines. The parity in technological 
capabilities among most of the European powers also becomes a contributing element in the crisis of 
strategy argued by Perjés. Furthermore, the research demonstrates the various activities in the realm of 
military thought. The growing number of military thinkers publishing their works, and attempting to 
formalize warfare into a study of its own shows the innovations of military thought from the previous 
centuries. As a result, it is questionable to label eighteenth-century warfare as “dynastic”, or “limited” in 
nature. The comparison of eighteenth-century warfare as inferior to warfare in the nineteenth-century based 
on the forces of ideologies and social factors provides limited answers. Considering the practical limitations 
of the eighteenth-century military system, as well as looking into relevant military writings of the time 
provides more relevant explanations.  
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